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Abstract
We consider an incentive for choice of options for an outside innovating firm to
license its new cost reducing technology to incumbent firms, or to enter into the
market with or without license in an oligopoly with three firms. We will show that
under linear demand and cost functions the results depend on the size of themarket.
When the market size is large, license to two incumbent firms with entry strategy
is the optimum strategy for the innovating firm. However, when the market size
is not large, license to one incumbent firm with or without entry strategy may be
optimum.
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1 Introduction
When an outside innovating firm has a superior cost reducing technology with which a
good can be produced at lower production cost, it may sell licenses to use its technology
to incumbent firms, or it may enters into the market and at the same time sell licenses
to incumbent firms, or enters into the market without license. We examine an incentive
for choice of options for an outside innovating firm to license its new cost reducing
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technology to incumbent firms without entry, or to enter into themarket with or without
license to incumbent firms in an oligopoly with three firms; two incumbent firms and one
outside innovating firm. The innovating firm can sell the license to one of two incumbent
firms, or both of two incumbent firms.
Assuming linear demand and cost functions, we will show that when themarket size is
large, license to two incumbent firms with entry strategy is the optimum strategy for the
innovating firm. However, when themarket size is not so large, license to one incumbent
firm with or without entry strategy may be optimum. It seems to be natural that the
larger the market size is, the larger the number of active firms and the number of new
technology adopting firms are.
In the next section we review some related results. In Section 3 we present a model of
this paper. In Section 4 we overview our main results, and describe grounds of license
fees in some details. In Section 5 we consider entry with or without license strategy. In
Section 6 we consider license only strategy. In Section 7 we calculate license fees and
the profits of the firms. In Section 8 we analyze the optimum strategy for the innovating
firm.
2 Some related studies
There are many references about technology adoption or R&D investment in duopoly
or oligopoly. Lots of researches focus on the relation between technology licensor and
licensee. The difference of means of contracts which are royalties, up-front fees, the
combinations of these two and auction are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)
and Kamien and Tauman (1986)). Kamien and Tauman (1986) shows that if the licen-
sor does not have production capacity, fixed fee is better than royalty and it is also better
for consumers. This topic under Stackelberg oligopoly is discussed in Kabiraj (2004)
when the licensor does not have production capacity, and discussed in Wang and Yang
(2004), Kabiraj (2005) and Filippini (2005) when the licensor has production capac-
ity. A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry is analyzed in La Manna
(1993). He shows that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower-cost firm al-
ways has the incentive to transfer its technology and hence a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
cannot be fully asymmetric, but there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.
On the other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe andMuto (2008) anal-
yses bargaining between licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms.
In resent research, market structure and technology improvement is analyzed. Boone
(2001) and Matsumura et. al. (2013), respectively, find a non-monotonic relation be-
tween intensity of competition and innovation. Also, Pal (2010) shows that technology
adoption may change the market outcome. The social welfare is larger in Bertrand
competition than in Cournot competition. However, if we consider technology adop-
tion, Cournot competition may make more social welfare than Bertrand competition
under differentiated goods market.
Some other studies are worthy of mention. Elberfeld and Nti (2004) examines the
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adoption of a new technology in oligopoly, where there is ex-ante uncertainty about
variable costs of the new technology, and shows that if in equilibrium both old and new
technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases (de-
creases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product price if
the up-front investment is large (small). Zhang et. al. (2014) analyzes the effect of
information spillovers when the outcome of R&D is uncertain in a two-stage Cournot
oligopoly model where a subset of firms first make a choice between two alternative
production technologies independently and then all firms compete in quantity. In Hat-
tori and Tanaka (2014) and Hattori and Tanaka (2015) adoption of new technology in
Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg duopoly is analyzed. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012)
presented analyses about the effectiveness of R&D subsidies in an oligopolistic model
in the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation.
Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license systemwhen the licensor is an outsider
and that when the licensor is an incumbent firm. Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) ar-
gued that low license fee can be used to deter entry of potential entrants. In this paper
we consider process innovation in a duopoly, that is, cost reducing innovation. Hat-
tori and Tanaka (2016) analyzed similar problems about product innovation, that is,
introduction of higher quality good under vertical product differentiation.
3 The model
There are three firms, Firm A, B and C. At present two of them, Firm B and C, produce
a homogeneous good. Firm A has a superior cost reducing technology and can produce
the good at lower cost than Firm B and C. We call Firm A the innovating firm, and Firm
B and C the incumbent firms. Firm A have the following fives options.
(1) To enter into the market without license to incumbent firms.
(2) To enter into the market and license its technology to one incumbent firm.
(3) To enter into the market and license its technology to two incumbent firms.
(4) To license its technology to one incumbent firm, but not enter into the market.
(5) To license its technology to two incumbent firms, but not enter into the market.
Let p be the price, xA, xB and xC be the outputs of FirmA, B and C. Then, the inverse
demand function of the good is written as follows.
p D p.xA C xB C xC /; when Firm A enters;
p D p.xB C xC /; when Firm A does not enter:
The cost functions of Firm A, B and C are denoted by cA.xA/, cB.xB/ and cC .xC /. cB./
and cC ./ are the same functions without license. If FirmA licenses its technology to two
incumbent firms, all cost functions are the same, and if Firm A licenses its technology
to one incumbent firm (for example Firm C), then the cost functions of Firm A and C
are the same.
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4 Overview of the results
We assume that the market is not so small and the innovating firm does not become a
monopolist when it enters into the market without license. We consider the following
two cases.
(1) Case 1: The market is large and the output of an incumbent firm which does not
buy the license to use cost reducing technology is positive even when only one
incumbent firm buys the license.
(2) Case 2: The market is small and the output of an incumbent firm which does not
buy the license to use cost reducing technology is zero when only one incumbent
firm buys the license.
According to the model of Sen and Tauman (2007) we assume that the innovating
firm auctions off one or two licenses to use its superior technology to the incumbent
firms conditional on that it enters into the market or not enter1.
The license fees in various cases are determined based on willingness to pay of the
incumbent firms as follows.
(1) If the innovating firm sells the license to one incumbent firm and enter into the
market, the license fee is equal to
“the profit of an incumbent firm when only this firm buys the license
and the innovating firm enters” minus “its profit when only the rival
firm buys the license and the innovating firm enters”.
This is because each incumbent firm knows that irrespective of whether it becomes
a licensee or not, there will always be one licensee, and the innovating firm enters
into the market.
(2) If the innovating firm sells the license to one incumbent firm and does not enter
into the market, the license fee is equal to
“the profit of an incumbent firmwhen only this firm buys the license and
the innovating firm does not enter” minus “its profit when only the rival
firm buys the license and the innovating firm does not enter”.
Again this is because each incumbent firm knows that irrespective of whether it
becomes a licensee or not, there will always be one licensee, and the innovating
firm does not enter.
(3) If the innovating firm sells the licenses to two incumbent firms and enter into the
market, the license fee is equal to
1In Sen and Tauman (2007) they consider two cases, innovation by an outside innovator and innovation
by an incumbent firm. However, they do not consider possibility of entry of an outside innovator into
the market.
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“the profit of an incumbent firmwhen two firms buy the licenses and the
innovating firm enters” minus “its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license and the innovating firm enters”.
This is because each incumbent firm knows that if it does not become a licensee,
there will be only one licensee, and the innovating firm enters into the market.
(4) If the innovating firm sells the license to two incumbent firms and does not enter
into the market, the license fee is equal to
“the profit of an incumbent firm when two firms buy the licenses and
the innovating firm does not enter” minus “its profit when only the rival
firm buys the license and the innovating firm does not enter”.
Again this is because each incumbent firm knows that if it does not become a
licensee, there will be only one licensee, and the innovating firm does not enter.
The results depend on the size of the market, or the volume of demand. We will show
the following results.
(1) When the size of the market is very large, license to two incumbent firms with
entry strategy is the optimum strategy. (Proposition 1 (1))
(2) When the size of the market is a bit large, license to one incumbent firmwith entry
strategy is the optimum strategy. (Proposition 1 (2))
(3) When the size of themarket is a bit small, license to one incumbent firmwith entry
strategy is the optimum strategy. (Proposition 2 (1))
(4) When the size of the market is very small, license to one incumbent firm without
entry strategy is the optimum strategy. (Proposition 2 (2))
It seems to be natural that the larger themarket size is, the larger the number of active
firms and the number of new technology adopting firms are.
Our results are somewhat similar to the results in Sen and Tauman (2007). However,
they did not considered entry by an outside innovator.
5 Entry with or without license strategy
First we consider cases where Firm A enters into the market with or without license to
incumbent firms.
5.1 The basic model
If Firm A enters into the market, the market becomes a tripoly. The profits of Firm A,
B and C are written as
A D p.xA C xB C xC /xA   cA.xA/;
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B D p.xA C xB C xC /xB   cB.xB/;
C D p.xA C xB C xC /xC   cC .xC /:
We assume Cournot type behavior of the firms. The conditions for profit maximization
are
p C p0xA   c0A D 0; p C p0xB   c0B D 0; p C p0xC   c0C D 0:
The second order conditions are
2p0 C p00xA   c00A < 0; 2p0 C p00xB   c00B < 0; 2p0 C p00xC   c00C < 0:
Hereafter we assume that the second order conditions in each case are satisfied.
5.2 Linear demand and cost functions
Specifically we assume that the inverse demand function and the cost functions are lin-
ear. The inverse demand function is written as follows.
p D a   .xA C xB C xC /;
where a is a positive constant. The marginal cost of FirmA is cA, and the marginal costs
of Firm B and C are cB , where 0 < cA < cB . However, if Firm B or C buys a license
to use cost reducing technology from Firm A, its marginal cost is cA. There is no fixed
cost. We assume a > 2cB   cA so that the innovating firm should not be a monopolist
when it enters into the market without license. We consider two cases.
(1) Case 1: a > 3cB   2cA. Then, the output of an incumbent firm which does not
buy the license to use cost reducing technology is positive when one firm buys the
license.
(2) Case 2: a  3cB  2cA. Then, the output of an incumbent firm which does not buy
the license to use cost reducing technology is zero when one firm buys the license.
5.2.1 License to no incumbent firm
When Firm A does not sell a license to use cost reducing technology, the profit maxi-
mizing conditions are
a   2xA   xB   xC   cA D 0;
a   xA   2xB   xC   cB D 0;
a   xA   xB   2xC   cB D 0:
Denote the equilibrium values of the outputs and profits of the firms and the price by
xe0A , xe0B , xe0C , e0A , e0B , e0C and pe0. Then,
xe0A D
a   3cA C 2cB
4
; xe0B D xe0C D
aC cA   2cB
4
; pe0 D aC cA C 2cB
4
;
e0A D
.a   3cA C 2cB/2
16
; e0B D e0C D
.aC cA   2cB/2
16
:
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5.2.2 License to one incumbent firm
When Firm A sells a license to one incumbent firm, we assume that this firm is Firm C.
Then, the profit maximizing conditions are
a   2xA   xB   xC   cA D 0;
a   xA   2xB   xC   cB D 0;
a   xA   xB   2xC   cA D 0:
There are two cases.
(1) Case 1: a > 3cB   2cA.
Denote the equilibrium values of the outputs and profits of the firms and the price
by xel1A , xel1B , xel1C , el1A , el1B , el1C and pel1. Denote the license fee in this case by
Lel1. Then,
xel1A D xel1C D
a   2cA C cB
4
; xel1B D
aC 2cA   3cB
4
;
pel1 D aC 2cA C cB
4
; el1A D
.a   2cA C 2cB/2
16
;
el1B D
.aC 2cA   3cB/2
16
; el1C   Lel1 D
.a   2cA C cB/2
16
  Lel1:
(2) Case 2: a  3cB   2cA.
Then, the equilibrium values of the outputs and profits of the firms are as follows.
xel1A D xel1C D
a   cA
3
; xel1B D 0;
pel1 D aC 2cA
3
; el1A D
.a   cA/2
9
;
el1B D 0; el1C   Lel1 D
.a   cA/2
9
  Lel1:
5.2.3 Licenses to two incumbent firms
When Firm A sells licenses to both incumbent firms, the profit maximizing conditions
are
a   2xA   xB   xC   cA D 0;
a   xA   2xB   xC   cA D 0;
a   xA   xB   2xC   cA D 0:
Denote the equilibrium values of the outputs and profits of the firms and the price by
xel2A , xel2B , xel2C , el2A , el2B , el2C and pel2. Denote the license fee in this case by Lel2.
Then,
xel2A D xel2B D xel2C D
a   cA
4
; pel2 D aC 3cA
4
;
el2A D
.a   cA/2
16
; el2B   Lel2 D el2C   Lel2 D
.a   cA/2
16
  Lel2:
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6 License only strategy
In this section we assume that Firm A licenses its technology to one or two incumbent
firms, but it does not enter into the market.
6.1 The basic model
If Firm A does not enter into the market, it is a duopoly. The profits of the firms are
written as
B D p.xB C xC /xB   cB.xB/;
C D p.xB C xC /xC   cC .xC /:
We assume Cournot type behavior of the firms. The conditions for profit maximization
are
p C p0xB   c0B D 0;
p C p0xC   c0C D 0:
6.2 Linear demand and cost functions
We assume that the demand function and the cost functions are linear. Similarly to the
previous section, the demand function is written as follows.
p D a   .xB C xC /;
where a is a positive constant. The marginal costs of Firm B and C are cB . However, if
Firm B or C buys a license to use cost reducing technology from Firm A, its marginal
cost is cA, where 0 < cA < cB . There is no fixed cost.
6.2.1 License to one incumbent firm
When Firm A sells a license to one incumbent firm, we assume that this firm is Firm C.
Then, the profit maximizing conditions are
a   2xB   xC   cB D 0;
a   xB   2xC   cA D 0:
Denote the equilibrium values of the outputs and profits of the firms and the price by
xl1B , xl1C ,  l1B ,  l1C and pl1. Denote the license fee in this case by Ll1. Then,
xl1B D
aC cA   2cB
3
; xl1C D
a   2cA C cB
3
;
pl1 D aC cA C cB
3
;
 l1B D
.aC cA   2cB/2
9
;  l1C   Ll1 D
.a   2cA C cB/2
9
  Ll1:
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6.2.2 License to two incumbent firms
When Firm A sells licenses to both incumbent firms, the profit maximizing conditions
are
a   2xB   xC   cA D 0;
a   xB   2xC   cA D 0:
Denote the equilibrium values of the outputs and profits of the firms and the price by
xl2B , xl2C ,  l2B ,  l2C and pl2. Denote the license fee in this case by Ll2. Then,
xl2B D xl2C D
a   cA
3
;
pl2 D aC 2cA
3
;
 l2B   Ll2 D  l2C   Ll2 D
.a   cA/2
9
  Ll2:
7 License fees and the profits of the firms
As stated in Section 4 according to themodel of Sen and Tauman (2007) we assume that
the innovating firm auctions off one or two licenses to use its superior technology to the
incumbent firms conditional on that it enters into the market or not enter. The license
fees in various cases are determined based on willingness to pay of the incumbent firms
as follows.
(1) If the innovating firm sells the license to one incumbent firm and enter into the
market, the license fee is equal to
“the profit of an incumbent firm when only this firm buys the license
and the innovating firm enters” minus “its profit when only the rival
firm buys the license and the innovating firm enters”.
Denote the license fee in this case by Lel1.
(2) If the innovating firm sells the license to one incumbent firm and does not enter
into the market, the license fee is equal to
“the profit of an incumbent firmwhen only this firm buys the license and
the innovating firm does not enter” minus “its profit when only the rival
firm buys the license and the innovating firm does not enter”.
Denote the license fee in this case by Ll1.
(3) If the innovating firm sells the licenses to two incumbent firms and enter into the
market, the license fee is equal to
“the profit of an incumbent firmwhen two firms buy the licenses and the
innovating firm enters” minus “its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license and the innovating firm enters”.
9
Denote the license fee in this case by Lel2.
(4) If the innovating firm sells the license to two incumbent firms and does not enter
into the market, the license fee is equal to
“the profit of an incumbent firm when two firms buy the licenses and
the innovating firm does not enter” minus “its profit when only the rival
firm buys the license and the innovating firm does not enter”.
Denote the license fee in this case by Ll2.
Therefore, we see
Lel1 D el1C   el1B ;
Ll1 D  l1C    l1B ;
Lel2 D el2C   el1B ;
Ll2 D  l2C    l1B :
7.1 Case 1
In this case a > 3cB   2cA. Thus, there exists t such that t > 1 and
a D t.cB   cA/C 2cB   cA:
When t is large (or small), the market size or the volume of demand is large (or small).
The license fees and the total profits of the innovating firm in various cases are as follows.
(1) When the innovating firm enters into the market and sells the license to one in-
cumbent firm, the license fee is
Lel1 D el1C   el1B D
.t C 1/.cB   cA/2
2
;
and the total profit of the innovating firm is
Lel1 C el1A D
.t2 C 14t C 17/.cB   cA/2
16
:
(2) When the innovating firm enters into the market and sells the licenses to two in-
cumbent firms, the license fee for each incumbent firm is
Lel2 D el2C   el1B D
3.2t C 1/.cB   cA/2
16
;
and the total profit of the innovating firm is
2Lel2 C el2A D
.t2 C 16t C 10/.cB   cA/2
16
:
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(3) When the innovating firm does not enter into the market and sells the license to
one incumbent firm, the license fee is
Ll1 D  l1C    l1B D
.2t C 3/.cB   cA/2
3
:
(4) When the innovating firm does not enter into the market and sells the licenses to
two incumbent firms, the license fee for each incumbent firm is
Ll2 D  l2C    l1B D
4.t C 1/.cB   cA/2
9
:
The total profit of the innovating firm is
2Ll2 D 8.t C 1/.cB   cA/
2
9
:
Also we have
e0A D
.t C 4/2.cB   cA/2
16
:
7.2 Case 2
Since 2cB   cA < a  3cB   2cA, there exists t such that 0 < t  1 and
a D t.cB   cA/C 2cB   cA:
Then, the license fees and the total profits of the innovating firm in various cases are as
follows.
(1) When the innovating firm enters into the market and sells the license to one in-
cumbent firm, the license fee is
Lel1 D el1C   el1B D
.t C 2/2.cB   cA/2
9
;
and the total profit of the innovating firm is
Lel1 C el1A D
2.t C 2/2.cB   cA/2
9
:
(2) When the innovating firm enters into the market and sells the licenses to two in-
cumbent firms, the license fee for each incumbent firm is
Lel2 D el2C   el1B D
.t C 2/2.cB   cA/2
16
;
and the total profit of the innovating firm is
2Lel2 C el2A D
3.t C 2/2.cB   cA/2
16
:
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(3) When the innovating firm does not enter into the market and sells the license to
one incumbent firm, the license fee is
Ll1 D  l1C    l1B D
.2t C 3/.cB   cA/2
3
:
(4) When the innovating firm does not enter into the market and sells the licenses to
two incumbent firms, the license fee for each incumbent firm is
Ll2 D  l2C    l1B D
4.t C 1/.cB   cA/2
9
:
The total profit of the innovating firm is
2Ll2 D 8.t C 1/.cB   cA/
2
9
:
Also, we have
e0A D
.t C 4/2.cB   cA/2
16
:
8 The optimum strategy for the innovating firm
Wemust compare the profits of the innovator gained by various strategies to investigate
its optimum strategy.
8.1 Case 1
Comparing el1A C Lel1, 2Ll2, Ll1 and e0A , we get
el1A C Lel1   2Ll2 D
.9t2   2t C 25/.cB   cA/2
144
;
el1A C Lel1   Ll1 D
.t C 3/.3t C 1/.cB   cA/2
48
;
el1A C Lel1   e0A D
.6t C 1/.cB   cA/2
16
:
Since t > 1, all of them are positive. Thus, license to one incumbent firm with entry
strategy is more beneficial than license to one or two incumbent firms without entry
strategies and entry only strategy.
Comparing el1A C Lel1 and el2A C 2Lel2 yields
el1A C Lel1   .el2A C 2Lel2/ D  
.2t   7/.cB   cA/2
16
:
This is positive when t < 7
2
and negative when t > 7
2
. Thus, we obtain the following
results.
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Lel1 C el1
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A
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Figure 1: Case 1
Proposition 1. In Case 1 where t > 1;
(1) when t > 7
2
, license to two incumbent firms with entry strategy is the optimum strat-
egy;
(2) when 1 < t < 7
2
, license to one incumbent firm with entry strategy is the optimum
strategy.
When t D 7
2
, both strategies are optimum.
Figure 1 illustrates the results of this case.
8.2 Case 2
Comparing Ll1 and el1A C Lel1, we get
Ll1   .el1A C Lel1/ D  
.2t2 C 2t   1/.cB   cA/2
9
:
When 0 < t <
p
3 1
2
, this is positive, and when t >
p
3 1
2
, this is negative. Comparing
Ll1, 2Ll2, el2A C 2Lel2 and e0A , we get
Ll1   2Ll2 D  .2t   1/.cB   cA/
2
9
;
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Figure 2: Case 2
Ll1   .el2A C 2Lel2/ D  
.cB   cA/2.9t2 C 4t   12/
48
;
Ll1   e0A D  
t .3t   8/.cB   cA/2
48
:
If 0 < t <
p
3 1
2
, they are all positive. Then, license to one incumbent firm without entry
strategy is more beneficial than all other strategies.
Comparing el1A C Lel1, 2Ll2, el2A C 2Lel2 and e0A , we get
el1A C Lel1   2Ll2 D
2.cB   cA/2t2
9
;
el1A C Lel1   .el2A C 2Lel2/ D
5.t C 2/2.cB   cA/2
144
;
el1A C Lel1   e0A D
.23t2 C 56t   16/.cB   cA/2
144
:
If t >
p
3 1
2
, they are all positive. Then, license to one incumbent firmwith entry strategy
is more beneficial than all other strategies.
Summarizing the results;
Proposition 2. In Case 2;
(1) when 1 < t <
p
3 1
2
, license to one incumbent firmwith entry strategy is the optimum
strategy.
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(2) when 0 < t <
p
3 1
2
, license to one incumbent firm without entry strategy is the
optimum strategy;
When t D
p
3 1
2
, both strategies are optimum.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of this case.
9 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed a choice of an innovating firm to license its technology to one or
two incumbent firms or to enter into the market, which is duopolistic, with or without
license in an oligopolywith three firms (tripoly). We have shown that the relative benefit
of license and entry depends on the size of the market.
In the future research we want to study the public policy by the government to pro-
mote or prevent license or entry by an innovating firm in domestic and international
settings, and extend the analysis in this paper to a case of vertical product differentia-
tion.
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